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Abstract
I distinguish three views, a defence of any one of which would go some
way towards vindicating the view that there is something objective about
the passage of time: (i) the view that the present moment is objectively dis-
tinguished; (ii) the view that time has an objective direction – that it is an
objective matter which of two non-simultaneous events is the earlier and
which the later; (iii) the view that there is something objectively dynamic,
flux-like, or “flow-like” about time. I argue that each of these views is not so
much false as doubtfully coherent. In each case, it turns out to be hard to
make sense of what the view could be, at least if it is to be non-trivial, and
of use to a friend of objective passage. I conclude with some remarks about
avenues that seem worth exploring in the philosophy of time, when we are
done with trying to make sense of passage.
 Introduction
Time seems to have a transitory character. We have the impression that it flows, or
passes. From here, well-worn paths of philosophical enquiry lead in two directions.
One seeks to regard this aspect of the human experience of time as a reflection
of the nature of time itself. The other treats it as merely a feature of human
experience, requiring a psychological rather than a metaphysical explanation.
In this chapter I want to explore the first path, and to explain why I think it
leads to a dead end – or rather to several dead ends, for it turns out that there
are several distinct threads bundled together in the intuitive notion of the flow of
time, each of which might be held to rescue something of the idea that the passage
of time is an objective feature of reality. I want to distinguish these strands, and to
argue that they all lead nowhere. I shall say little about the alternative view, that
*To appear in Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Time, Oxford University Press.
†Centre for Time, Main Quad A, University of Sydney, NSW , Australia.

the apparent passage of time should be regarded as a psychological phenomenon,
but it will be clear that I regard it as much more promising, if only by default. I
close with some remarks about avenues that seem worth exploring in the philoso-
phy of time, when we are done with trying to make sense of passage.
. Three paths to passage
What would the world have to be like, for the flow of time to be an objective
feature of reality? It seems to me that we can distinguish three possible answers to
this question, compatible but largely independent. Hence there are three distinct
views, a defence of any one of which would go some way towards vindicating
the view that there is something objective about the passage of time. Of course,
defending three or two of these claims would be better than defending only one;
but one – any one – would rescue something of the intuitive notion:
. The view that the present moment is objectively distinguished.
. The view that time has an objective direction; that it is an objective matter
which of two non-simultaneous events is the earlier and which the later.
. The view that there is something objectively dynamic, flux-like, or “flow-
like” about time.
It seems to me that these views have not been sufficiently distinguished, either
by defenders or critics of the notion of objective passage – a fact which has allowed
the two sides to talk past one another, in various ways. I shall say a little more
about why they are distinct in what follows. Mostly, however, my plan is to argue
against each view independently. In each case, I shall claim, the view in question
is not so much false as doubtfully coherent. On examination, it turns out to be
hard to make sense of what the view could be, at least if it is to be non-trivial, and
of use to a friend of objective passage.
 Is there an objective ‘present moment’?
One major component of the intuitive idea of the passage of time is that it in-
volves a distinguished but continually variable ‘present moment’ – a single ‘box’
or ‘frame’, whose contents are continually changing. One version of this idea is at
the heart of presentism, a view which holds that the present moment is all there is
– that the past and future simply don’t exist. Of course, presentists normally com-
bine this view with the claim that the present moment (or its contents) change.
But it is worth noting that this is a separate claim. If presentism itself is coherent,

then why not a presentism of a single moment (fictionalist, perhaps, about time
and change)? We’ll return to this presentism-without-change in a moment.
Presentism is not the only version of the view that there is a distinguished
present moment. Another version, more useful for our present purposes, is what
has become known as themoving spotlight view. As Zimmerman (: ) notes,
this image is due to C. D. Broad, who introduces it in this passage:
We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world as existing
eternally in a certain order of events. Along this, and in a fixed direc-
tion, we imagine the characteristic of presentness as moving, some-
what like the spot of light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the
fronts of the houses in a street. What is illuminated is the present,
what has been illuminated is the past, and what has not yet been illu-
minated is the future. (Broad, : )
There is something deeply puzzling about Broad’s metaphor, however. After
all, place yourself at any moment in time, and ask yourself “Is this moment the
present moment?” The right answer, obviously, is “Yes” – a fact guaranteed by the
stipulation that you are to ask the question of a moment, at that moment. But
this means that if the houses in a street are to play the role of moments of time in
Broad’s analogy, then the answer to the question, “If you place yourself in one of
the houses, and open the front door, will the policeman’s bull’s-eye be shining in
your face?” must also be “Yes” – which means that the light must be shining on
all the houses, not just on one!
One might reply that this objection ignores the fact the light shines on each
house in succession, so that we simply need to add a temporal stipulation to the
question about what you see when you open the front door, for all to be well. Will
you see the light? Perhaps, but it depends on when you open the door.
But this reply overlooks the fact that the series of houses was supposed to be
playing the role of the series of temporal moments. To introduce this temporal
aspect to the question, we would need a second temporal parameter, other than
the one assumed to be represented by the series of houses. Some writers have
been prepared to bite this bullet, to try to save the notion of a distinguished (but
changing) present moment. But the option is neither appealing nor promising.
In the present context, the obvious objection is that the issues of making sense of
flow will arise all over again, with respect to the second temporal dimension; and
hence that we will have made no progress by introducing it.
The source of the difficulty is that the moving spotlight view is trying to com-
bine two elements, which pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it wants
As Broad himself appreciates – he does not endorse this view.

to be exclusive, saying that one moment is objectively distinguished. On the other
hand it wants to be inclusive, saying that all moments get their turn – their Warho-
lian instant of fame, when the spotlight turns on them alone. (Everybody is a star.)
Imagine an attempt to defend a similar combination in another case: concern-
ing persons, or minds, rather than times. We are familiar with solipsism, which
for present purposes we might think of as the view that only our own mind “has
the lights on,” and that everyone else is a mere zombie. This is an exclusive view,
and let us now try to combine it with an inclusive element. Suppose first that
“having the lights on” is a matter of being energized by some heavenly bull’s-eye –
being at the point of focus of the divine gaze, say. And to make the view inclusive,
suppose that the focus of the divine gaze varies from person to person. God’s eyes
follow humanity around the room, as it were. Whoever you happen to be, you’ll
always find them directed at you. (This is the analogue of the fact that if you place
yourself at any moment in time and ask “Is this moment the present moment?”,
the right answer is always “Yes.”)
At this point, clearly, we’ve added inclusivity at the cost of exclusivity. We’ve
lost the idea the one person is objectively distinguished, as the object of the divine
gaze. We can still make sense of the idea that each person is distinguished from her
own point of view. But this is too weak to give us what the solipsist wanted: viz.,
a deep, non-perspectival sense in which one person is objectively distinguished.
In the temporal case, the same dilemma confronts any attempt to combine an
(exclusive) objective “present moment” with the (inclusive) view that all moments
get their turn. The inclusive aspect threatens to overwhelm the exclusive aspect,
reducing it to an innocuous and uncontroversial perspectivalism.
For a defender of the objective present, the only option at this point seems
to be to try to save exclusivity by back-pedalling on inclusivity. The presentist
needs to insist that this moment, now, has privileged status. There is no legitimate
inclusive view, except in the sense that we can make sense of it from this exclusive
perspective. In place of the inclusive image of a movie, with a long series of frames,
the presentist needs to insist that there is only one frame – one aspect of which is
labelled The Story So Far, being a representation within this single frame of what
the exclusive view thinks of as the content of the previous frames (and similarly for
an aspect labelled Upcoming Episodes).
But can this shift to the exclusive view succeed, without fatal damage to the
intuitions that inclusivity was intended to respect? Here it is worth noting a dif-
ferent between presentism and solipsism. For a solipsist, there may be no need for
a surrogate for inclusivity. For a presentist, on the other hand, the desire to make
Unless perhaps for a kind of fictionalism about other persons, to make some sense of one’s own
behaviour with respect to the zombies with which one shares the planet.

sense of passage creates an immediate and pressing need for such a surrogate. Af-
ter all, the idea that every instant has its own moment in the spotlight was driven
by intuitions about passage. But can we make enough sense of this idea, for the
purposes of a realist view of passage, within an exclusive view of this kind?
It seems to me that there are two obstacles here, which act together to provide
a fatal dilemma for any ‘distinguished present’ version of objective passage.
. Frozen-block presentism. The first problem is that in defending exclusiv-
ity at the cost of inclusivity, the presentist seems to have thrown out not just the
baby, but almost the entire bathroom. After all, what did God need to create, in
order to create the whole of reality, as our exclusive presentist describes it? Not a
long series of world-stages, but just a single moment, complete with its internal
representation of a past and future. It is as if we’ve built just one house in ‘Broad
Street’, relying on stories its occupants tell about imaginary neighbours as surro-
gates for all the rest. (They tell us about the time the police shine their bull’s eye
on the ne’er-do-wells at Number , but this is just make-believe. There is no
such address, and no family who live there.)
For present purposes, what matters most about this is that we seem to have
lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition. All
of these notions seem to involve a relation between equals, a passing of the baton
between one state of affairs an another. But in this picture, we’ve lost one party to
the transaction. We’ve lost genuine change, and replaced it, at best, with a kind of
fiction about change.
. Inclusivity strikes back. At this point, our opponent is likely to object
that for one reason or another, this conclusion is too strong: the exclusive picture
does allow for real transition, change and passage, in so far as it needs to, to make
sense of a objectivist view of these things. It allows that change has happened and
will happen, and that’s all the objectivist needs.
However, this reply leaves the opponent vulnerable to the second horn of the
dilemma. Let’s allow that presentist can make sense of future change which is “real
enough” for the purposes of a defence of objective passage. Since, by assumption,
this act of making sense is being done from a standpoint that privileges the present
moment, it is ‘inclusive’ with respect to all other moments (in whatever sense in
can make of such talk at all), in treating them all on a par. The depiction of
change in the Upcoming Episodes part of this picture depicts all future moments
in the same way. None of them is privileged in this representation, though of course
each may be depicted as privileged – harmlessly and trivially, as we noted above –
from its own point of view. So the distinguished moment view has now become

self-undermining; committed to the view that change can be represented without
a distinguished moment.
Think of the other houses in Broad Street represented in a picture on the wall
of the actual (“present”) house. Which, if any, of the other houses should be
shown on in the picture as illuminated by the spotlight? If none, then the aspect
of the model that corresponds to change has disappeared completely. If one, then
which one – what could break the symmetry? And if all, then what has happened
to the idea that the representation of change requires a distinguished moment?
To summarise, our strategy was this. Faced with an opponent who holds that
change requires a distinguished present moment, we granted her view a distin-
guished moment from which to speak, and argued that the view then falls victim
to a dilemma: either it cannot make sense of change at all, from that distin-
guished standpoint; or it does so without a distinguished standpoint. Either we
lose change, because from this distinguished standpoint there is no change in the
past and future; or we accept that change can be modelled in an inclusive way (i.e.,
without a distinguished moment), which undermines the motivation for playing
the game in this way in the first place.
. Comparison with McTaggart
As readers may have noticed, there are similarities between the above discussion
and J. M. E. McTaggart’s famous () argument for the view that time itself is
unreal. McTaggart’s argument proceeds in three steps:
. He argues that there is no time without change.
. He maintains that real change requires that events change with respect to
the properties of pastness, presentness and futurity: they begin as future, and
become present, and then past. Combined with premise (), this implies
that the reality of time depends on the reality of the properties of pastness,
presentness and futurity.
. He argues that these properties cannot be real for they are incoherent: each
event must have all three, and yet they are contradictory.
Many commentators get off the boat at steps () or (), denying that time
requires change, or denying that change needs to be conceived in terms of acquisi-
tion and loss of the properties of pastness, presentness and futurity. But these op-
tions hardly reduces the interest of the argument as whole; which can be thought
of, after all, as an argument for the need to jump ship in one or both of these ways,
if one wants to be a realist about time and/or change.

Much interest therefore lies in step () – especially so, in the present context,
since it is easy to reconstrue McTaggart’s argument as an argument against the
moving spotlight view, using the two properties illuminated (i.e., present) and not
illuminated (not present) in place of the three properties past, present and future.
At this point, in this slightly modified form, McTaggart’s argument claims
that each moment must have both properties, illuminated and not illuminated;
and that this is incoherent. My approach has been to take a slightly different tack,
emphasising the pressure on the moving present view to combine an inclusive
view, in which all moments are on a par with respect to these properties, with
an exclusive view, in which one moment is distinguished as uniquely illuminated.
We saw that the inclusive element threatens to drive out the exclusive element,
by requiring us to acknowledge that each moment is equally illuminated, from its
own point of view.
I have noted the option of stressing the exclusive view, by insisting that we can
speak from nowhere except a particular moment, and hence that we can say truth-
fully that only that moment is illuminated. This option is available to opponents
of McTaggart’s step (), too. They can simply deny that all events have all three
properties, pastness, presentness and futurity, insisting from the standpoint of a
particular moment (while denying the availability of any other standpoint) that
each event only has one: if it is not present, then it is either past or future (though
not both). But for McTaggart’s opponents, as for mine, this option leads to a
fatal dilemma. Either it discards the baby with the bathwater, leaving them with
a frozen presentism, lacking the conceptual resources to make sense of change (by
their own lights). Or it sneaks the inclusive view back in, in its own depiction of
past and future change.
I conclude that there is no coherent notion of an objectively distinguished present,
at least of the sort required to provide an ingredient of an objective flow of time.
If objective flow is to be a coherent notion, it will have to constituted, somehow,
from the remaining ingedients.
 An objective direction of time?
The second ingredient is the idea that time has an objective direction – that there
is an objective distinction between past and future, earlier and later. Concerning
this ingredient, we can get a good sense of what is at issue by comparing some
remarks from writers on opposite sides. First, on the “pro” side of the question,
consider the following characterisation of the passage of time by Tim Maudlin:

The passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal struc-
ture of the world, an asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart. It is
the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between sequences which
run from past to future and sequences which run from future to past.
Consider, for example, the sequence of events that makes up an as-
teroid traveling from the vicinity of Mars to the vicinity of the Earth,
as opposed to the sequence that makes up an asteroid moving from
the vicinity of Earth to that of Mars. These sequences might be
“matched”, in the sense that to every event in the one there corre-
sponds an event in the other which has the same bodies in the same
spatial arrangement. The topological structure of the matched states
would also be matched: if state B is between states A and C in one
sequence, then the corresponding state B* would be between A* and
C* in the other. Still, going from Mars to Earth is not the same as
going from Mars to Earth. The difference, if you will, is how these
sequences of states are oriented with respect to the passage of time.
If the asteroid gets closer to Earth as time passes, then the asteroid
is going in one direction, if it gets farther it is going in the other
direction. So the passage of time provides an innate asymmetry to
temporal structure. (: )
As Maudlin points out, however, not just any intrinsic asymmetry will do the
trick:
[T]he passage of time connotes more than just an intrinsic asymme-
try: not just any asymmetry would produce passing. Space, for exam-
ple, could contain some sort of intrinsic asymmetry, but that alone
would not justify the claim that there is a “passage of space” or that
space passes. (: )
So one question we want to keep in mind, in considering the general issue of in-
trinsic temporal asymmetry and directionality, is whether a particular asymmetry
is of the right kind to “produce passing”, and what kind this could be.
. Boltzmann’s Copernican moment
The possibility that there may be no objective direction of time is famously pre-
sented in the following remarks by Ludwig Boltzmann, from his Lectures in Gas
Theory of –:
Boltzmann first presents these ideas in an () letter to Nature, attributing them to his ‘old
assistant, Dr Schuetz.’ His suggestion about the non-objectivity of the direction of time is offered in

One can think of the world as a mechanical system of an enormously
large number of constituents, and of an immensely long period of
time, so that the dimensions of that part containing our own “fixed
stars” are minute compared to the extension of the universe; and times
that we call eons are likewise minute compared to such a period.
Then in the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium throughout
and therefore dead, there will occur here and there relatively small
regions of the same size as our galaxy (we call them single worlds)
which, during the relatively short time of eons, fluctuate noticably
from thermal equilibrium, and indeed the state probability in such
cases will be equally likely to increase or decrease. For the universe,
the two directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space there
is no up and down. However, just as at a particular place on the earth’s
surface we call “down” the direction toward the center of the earth, so
will a living being in a particular time interval of such a single world
distinguish the direction of time toward the less probable state from
the opposite direction (the former toward the past, the latter toward
the future). (: –)
Let us compare Boltzmann’s viewpoint with Maudlin’s. Would Boltzmann
deny that there is a difference between asteroid moving from the vicinity of Earth
to that of Mars and the same asteroid moving from the vicinity of Mars to that
of Earth? I think we can be sure that he would not! Rather, he would maintain
that while of course the two cases are different, there’s no fact of the matter as
to which is which. At best, there’s a fact of the matter relative to a particular
temporal perspective, or choice of coordinate frame. A good analogy is with the
issue as to whether, in a Newtonian framework, there is an objective distinction
between an asteroid at rest and an asteroid moving at a uniform non-zero velocity.
Boltzmann’s view compares to the relationist view that there is no such distinction:
fix a coordinate frame, and you can certainly distinguish between the two cases,
but nothing distinguishes a unique “correct” coordinate frame.
the context of an avowedly tentative proposal concerning the origins of the state of thermodynamic
disequilibrium in which we now find ourselves. Despite certain striking theoretical advantages
– in particular, that it permits the observed thermodynamic time-asymmetry to emerge from a
model with no temporal asymmetry at all, at the global level – this proposal about the source of
disequilibrium faces seemingly damning objections (see, e.g., Price , for more on these issues).
But neither these difficulties, nor the tentative spirit in which Boltzmann presents the proposal,
in any way diminish the importance of the recognition that the direction of time might not be
objective. In putting that possibility on the table, Boltzmann is, as Hans Reichenbach (: )
puts it, providing “one of the keenest insights into the problem of time.”
Another analogy, to which we’ll return, is a reworking of a famous example we have from Kant
(opposing Kant’s own view about the case) : a world with two hands of opposite parity, but no fact

For present purposes, the important issue is this one. If Boltzmann is wrong,
what exactly is he wrong about? What extra feature does the world have, that it
does not have in the Boltzmann picture? What could make it the case that there
is an objective earlier–later relation?
. Orientability: necessary but not sufficient
Our interest in the issue of the direction of time is guided by an attempt to make
sense of the notion of the passage or flow of time. If time has a direction in a
sense relevant to passage, then presumably it is the same everywhere – passage is
supposed to be global, universal and unidirectional. This implies that a precondi-
tion of any relevant notion of the direction of time is that it be possible to assign
a temporal direction at every place and time, in a consistent way. In other words,
we want to be able to pick a temporal direction, and label it (say) the positive
direction, without our labels suddenly changing, as we move from place to place.
Formalised a little bit, this means that a precondition for the existence of any
relevant notion of the direction of time is that the spacetime within which we live
be temporally “orientable”, in the following sense:
A relativistic spacetime (M,gab) is temporally orientable iff there ex-
ists a continuous everywhere defined timelike vector field on M. If
such a field exists, reversing the arrows gives another such field. The
choice of one of these fields as “pointing the way to the future” is
what is meant by the assignment of a time orientation. (Earman and
Wüthrich, , fn. )
The important point to note here is that such an “assignment” of a time orien-
tation, while it requires temporal orientability, does not require or imply that there
be a unique correct assignment, dictated by some objective feature of reality. So,
while orientability is necessary for the existence of an objective direction of time,
in the intended sense, it is far from sufficient. Orientability ensures that if we
decide by convention that one of two asteroids is travelling fromMars, towards the
Earth, then we can extend the convention to the rest of spacetime in a consistent
way. It does not ensure that such a choice of convention would be objectively right
or wrong, or even tell us what it would be for there to be an objective standard of
such a kind.
of the matter as to which of the two is the left hand and which the right hand.

. Earman v. Reichenbach
We stressed a moment ago that if there is a direction of time of a kind relevant to
the passage of time, it had better be a global notion. This point connects closely
with an argument John Earman offers against Reichenbach, in a seminal ()
paper. Reichenbach’s posthumous book, The Direction of Time (), defends a
view resembling Boltzmann’s, to the effect that the direction of time is potentially
a local matter, reducible to the direction of entropy increase in a particular region
of spacetime. Earman objects as follows:
Reichenbach himself grants that space-time can be assumed to be a
manifold with a null cone structure, and can be assumed to be tem-
porally orientable. But this seems enough to justify the following
Principle of Precedence.
PP Assuming that space-time is temporally orientable, contin-
uous timelike transport takes precedence over any method
(based on entropy or the like) of fixing time direction; that
is, if the time senses fixed by a given method in two regions
of space-time (on whatever interpretation of ‘region’ you
like) disagree when compared by means of transport which
is continuous and which keeps timelike vectors timelike,
then if one sense is right, the other is wrong.
To put the matter in a nutshell, PP says that (assuming temporal ori-
entability) once the time sense is established anywhere in space-time,
the structure of space-time (in particular, the null cone structure and
spatio-temporal continuity) serve to fix it everywhere. From PP we
can conclude that if there is disagreement, then either (i) neither time
sense is right or wrong or else (ii) one is right and the other is wrong,
and, therefore, the given method is not generally correct. Using the
following fact
F With Reichenbach’s entropy method it is always physically
possible and in many cases highly likely (according to sta-
tistical mechanics) that there will be disagreement.
we can conclude that it is always physically possible and in many cases
highly likely that either (a) there is no right or wrong about time
As I noted above, Reichenbach describes Boltzmann’s view on this point as one of the “keen-
est insights” about time, saying that Boltzmann was the “first to have the courage to draw this
conclusion.” (: )

direction-talk about which direction is “really” the future and which
is “really” the past is not meaningful anywhere in space-time or (b)
the entropy method yields the wrong result somewhere in space-time.
Reichenbach can accept neither (a) nor (b) because he claims that the
content of the philosophically purified concept of time direction is
given by the entropy method. (: )
However, so long as we recognise that there are two distinct conceptions of
the project of giving an account of the direction of time – roughly, Maudlin’s,
which treats the direction of time as something global and fundamental, and
Boltzmann’s, which treats it on a par with “up” and “down” – then it is easy to
see how Reichenbach might have responded to Earman. He could say that if by
“direction of time” we agree to mean Boltzmann’s local notion, then he rejects PP;
while if we mean Maudlin’s global notion, then he can accept Earman’s option
(a). The trick is simply to notice that a “philosophically purified concept of time
direction” requires that we distinguish two notions: about one of them, there may
be “no right or wrong”; about the other, the truth may vary from place to place.
I am not sure to what extent this irenic distinction would have appealed to
Earman’s targets – the proponents of the view that “the” direction of time was
reducible to the thermodynamic asymmetry. But for present purposes, since our
interest is in the prospects of making sense of a strong, global sense of the direc-
tion of time, we can ignore this interpretational issue: Earman seems right that
direction in the strong sense cannot be reduced in this way, whether or not Re-
ichenbach and others actually thought that it could be.
. Earman’s Heresy
Earman took the view that the existence of an objective direction of time turns
on issues of time-invariance and reversibility to be so much an orthodoxy that he
refers to the alternative as a heresy. As he puts it:
[I]t will be useful for sake of contrast to state explicitly a view which
goes directly counter to the reductionist position outlined above. I
will refer to this view as The Time Direction Heresy. It states first of all
that if it exists, a temporal orientation is an intrinsic feature of space-
time which does not need to be and cannot be reduced to nontempo-
ral features, and secondly that the existence of a temporal orientation
does not hinge as crucially on irreversibility as the reductionist would
True, it might be argued that the latter is not properly called a notion of the direction of time;
but at this point the argument is about terminology.

have us believe. I am not at all sure that The Time Direction Heresy
is correct, but I am certain that a failure to consider it, if only for
purposes of contrast, will only lead to further stagnation. (: ,
emphasis in bold mine)
As Maudlin (: ) notes, “Earman himself does not unequivocally endorse
the Heresy, but does argue that no convincing arguments against it could be
found, at that time, in the very extensive literature on the direction of time.”
“Over three decades later,” Maudlin continues, “I think this is still the case, and I
want to positively promote the Heresy. . . . [My] Chapter can be seen as a some-
what more aggressive companion piece to [Earman’s].”
Like Maudlin, I am a fan of Earman’s Heresy; and I, too, want to support it
in blunter form. But unlike Maudlin, I do so by denying its antecedent – i.e., by
denying that there is any direction of time in the strong sense – not by affirming
that there is such a direction (though not one reducible to irreversibility). I think
that Earman is right to reject reductionism, and to question the relevance of the
issue of time-invariance of the laws of physics to that of the direction of time; but
wrong to the extent that he believes that the answer might lie somewhere else. On
the contrary, I claim: the right answer is that there is no answer.
. Earman and the no direction option
The possibility that there might be no objective direction of time is explicitly on
Earman’s radar, early in his paper. We have seen that he acknowledges it in the
passage quoted above, in which he introduces his Heresy. And a page before that,
he sets out some of the issues to be considered, as follows:
P Does the world come equipped with a time orientation?
P If the answer to P is affirmative, where does it come from?
If the answer is negative, what explains our psychological
feeling of a direction for time?
P If the answer to P is affirmative, how do we know which
of the two possible orientations is the actual one?
P and P are in rather crude form. One of the purposes of this paper
is to sharpen them. If there is a global time order, then P amounts
to the following: given that either E(x, y) or E(y, x) [i.e., x is earlier
than y, or y is earlier than x], how do we know which holds? (:
)
However, I think it is fair to say that with one (partial) exception, these ques-
tions hardly get addressed in Earman’s paper. The main exception is the first part

of P, but even this is addressed only in a conditional and negative fashion. In
defending the Heresy, Earman defends the view that if there is a temporal orien-
tation, then it is not reducible to issues of irreversibility and the like. But this is
not to argue that there is such an orientation; or to explain where it comes from,
if so; or to answer P.
By the end of Earman’s paper, however, the possibility of a negative answer to
P seems to have dropped out of sight:
In summary, I think that there are grounds for believing that entropy
is not as important as some philosophers would have us believe for
the temporal asymmetries discussed above. It also seems to me that
these asymmetries are not crucial for some of the aspects of the prob-
lem of the direction of time; for on my view, laws and/or boundary
conditions might have been such that these asymmetries did not exist
and still it would have made sense to speak of a direction for time, or else
the laws and boundary conditions might have been such that these
asymmetries were the reverse of what they are now without it neces-
sarily being the case that the direction of time is the reverse of what it is
now. (: , my emphasis)
But nowhere does Earman venture an opinion about what it would be for the
direction of time to be “the reverse of what it is now” – or, what would presumably
amount to the same thing, what it is for time to have a particular direction.
. Great heroics
Earman does consider the opposing view, that there is no direction of time, and
to some extent his conception of what it is for there to be a direction of time can
be discerned from what he says against the opposing view. But the inference is
difficult, because Earman takes his main opponent – the Reichenbach–Gold view,
as he calls it – to be arguing that the existence of a direction of time depends on
the non-time-invariance of the laws of physics. Against this opponent, he argues
(forcefully, in my view) that the considerations which might lead us to deny the
existence of a direction of time in the case of a time-invariant physics would apply
equally forcefully in the non-time-invariant case. This is a good argument against
the Reichenbach–Gold view, but it helps rather than hinders the more radical
view that there is no direction of time (whatever the time-invariance properties of
the laws of physics). In focussing his attention on the Reichenbach–Gold view,
Earman seems to leave his flank open to a Boltzmannian opponent.
Earman introduces his discussion of the Reichenbach–Gold view with these
words:

The radical view that if all the laws of nature were time reversal in-
variant, then there would be no right or wrong in the matter since
there could be no temporal orientation, is a view which can also be
discussed in Reichenbach’s writings. Since this view need not be based
on a reductionistic attitude towards space-time, since it has been held
by many others besides Reichenbach, and since it goes to the heart of
the obsession with irreversibility, it will be examined in some detail in
the following section. (: )
Earman describes the Reichenbach–Gold view itself as follows:
Now imagine that T is a super theory which captures all of the laws
of physics and suppose that T is time reversal invariant. In such a
case, Reichenbach would maintain that for anymMTD , m and T(m)
are not descriptions of two different physically possible worlds but
rather are “equivalent descriptions” of one and the same world and
that, therefore, “it would be meaningless to ask which of the two
descriptions is true” [Reichenbach, : –]. Reichenbach is not
alone in this interpretation. For instance, T. Gold says that in the
envisioned situation, T(m)
is not describing another universe, or how it might be but
isn’t, but is describing the very same thing [as m]. [Gold,
: ]
The upshot is supposed to be that if universal time reversal invariance
holds, there is no objective fact of the matter as regards time direction
or time order since m and T(m) involve different time directions and
orders. (Earman, : )
Most of Earman’s objections to the Reichenbach–Gold view are of the kind
mentioned above, turning on the claim that there is a direction of time in the
non-time-invariant case. The first, however, is more general:
Even before going into the details of time reversal invariance, I think
the implausibility of the Reichenbach–Gold position should be ap-
parent from several considerations. First, a characterization of invari-
ance under charge conjugationC andmirror image reflection P can be
given along the same lines as given above for T invariance. If then the
Reichenbach–Gold position is correct for T, why isn’t it also correct
for C and P? Why doesn’t C (P) invariance imply that m and C(m)
(P(m)) are not descriptions of two different possible worlds but rather

equivalent descriptions of the same world? And would it not then
follow that the predicates ‘having a positive (negative) charge’ and
‘having a righthanded (lefthanded) orientation’ do not correspond to
any objective feature of reality? (If the conditions of the CPT theo-
rem of quantum field theory apply, then m and CPT(m) will always
be equivalent descriptions.) Either this consequence must be swal-
lowed or else it must be maintained that there is some feature which
makes m and T(m) but not m and C(m) or m and P(m) equivalent
descriptions. To grasp the second horn of this dilemma would require
an explanation of what the relevant feature is. No such explanation
seems forthcoming. Grasping the [first] horn would seem to involve
a great heroism [Earman notes here that Gold (: ) does grasp
this horn]; but in any case it would be an admission that there is nothing
special about time direction per se and that the alleged nonobjectivity is
the result of a far flung nonobjectivity. (: )
I’ll return in a moment to the option Earman takes to “involve a great hero-
ism”, which seems to me the right choice here; although now to require no great
courage, if it ever did. Earman seems quite right to suggest that the case of T, C
and P are likely to be on a par. He returns to the point a little further on in his pa-
per, in connection with the claims of another proponent of the Reichenbach–Gold
view, Max Black.
Asking what argument could be given in favour of the Reichenbach–Gold
position, Earman (: ) offers the following suggestion:
One obvious suggestion would be to try to accommodate time rever-
sal to the passive interpretation of symmetry. For on the passive in-
terpretation, a symmetry operation corresponds not to a change from
one physical system to another but rather a change, so to speak, of the
point of view from which the system is described; if both the original
description resulting from the original point of view and the new de-
scription resulting from the new point of view are equally legitimate
according to T, then T is said to be invariant under the transforma-
tion which goes from one point of view to the other. Not surprisingly,
such an interpretation of time reversal invariance has been offered.
Max Black concludes that if all the laws of physics were time reversal
invariant, the relation of chronological precedence would be an “in-
complete” relation in that it would really be a three-place relation like
the relations of being to the left of and being to the right of.
From my perspective, the true hero of the contemporary scene is Maudlin, playing a stout
Cardinal Bellarmine to Boltzmann’s Galileo.

We would have to say that the very same series of events A,
B, C,might properly be described by one observer as being
in temporal arrangement in which A occurred first, while
that very same series could properly be described by some
other observer as being in the opposite temporal arrange-
ment in which C occured first. [Black, : ]
To this, Earman responds:
Black seems correct to the extent that his conclusion would follow if
the passive interpretation of T were legitimate. But many physicists
regard this and similar conclusions about C and P as a reductio ad ab-
surdum of the passive interpretation of the discrete symmetries C, P,
and T. The passive interpretation of continuous symmetries, like spa-
tial rotation, is meaningful since one can suppose at least in principle
that an idealized observer can rotate himself in space in correspon-
dence with the given spatial rotation. . . . But how is an observer,
even an idealized one, supposed to “rotate himself in time ?” (:
–)
Again, I think Earman is quite correct to treat C, P, and T as on a par here.
But the challenge that follows seems unsuccessful. The obvious reply is that the
passive interpretation of the symmetries requires not the rotation of the original
idealized observer, but only (at most), the idealized postulation of a second ob-
server who stands in the appropriate “rotated” relationship to the first observer.
Far from being unimaginable in the temporal case, this is exactly the possibility
that Boltzmann imagines – and for real observers, too, not merely idealized ones.
(The view Black is describing here is essentially Boltzmann’s, of course.)
Earman continues his response to Max Black by pointing out that an appeal
to the passive interpretation of the symmetries is much more powerful than Black
himself takes it to be:
Black’s passive interpretation of time reversal is too powerful; for this con-
clusion follows whether or not the laws of physics are time reversal invari-
ant. Thus, it follows from the very fact that a passive interpretation
of spatial rotation can be given that the relations of being to the left
of and being to the right of are “incomplete relations” irrespective
of whether or not the laws of physics are invariant under spatial ro-
tations. Similarly, the “incompleteness” of the relation of temporal
precedence would follow from the existence of a passive interpreta-
tion of time reversal irrespective of whether or not the laws of physics
are time reversal invariant. (: )

“As a result,” Earman concludes, “the passive interpretation is of no use to some-
one who wants to maintain the Reichenbach–Gold position.” (: )
Once again, I think that Earman’s objection here is entirely correct, as a point
against the Reichenbach–Gold–Black view (at least to the extent that these authors
really are committed to the claim that if physics is not time-invariant, then there
is a fundamental direction of time). But it is no objection at all against what I
am treating as the Boltzmann view, viz., that there is no fundamental direction of
time in any case, whether or not the laws are time-invariant. (Again, Earman has
his eye on the Reichenbach–Gold position, and doesn’t watch the threat from the
other flank.)
. Modal collapse?
Another concern that Earman mentions about the “passive” interpretation of the
C, P andT symmetries is, if I understand it correctly, that it sets us on (or threatens
to set us on) a slippery slope towards treating all differences as “merely notational.”
[I]f on the Reichenbach-Gold position, all possible worlds are not to
collapse into a single one, there must be some objective feature which
separates them and which can be ascertained to hold independently
of the direction of time. (: )
In other words (as I interpret the point), it would clearly be reductio of the “passive”
methodology if it required us to treat all differences between theories as mere
differences in notation, describing the same possible world. To prevent a slide
to this absurdity, we need some fixed points – roughly, some features which can
be identified independently of alternative theoretical notations on offer. In the
temporal case, these need to be features, as Earman says, “which can be ascertained
to hold independently of the direction of time.”
There are some interesting and deep issues here, which deserves much more
attention than I can give them in this context. For present purposes, I simply
want to point out that there’s a danger in the other direction, too. If the desire
for fixed points makes us too unadventurous, we’ll decline some of the greatest
adventures that science has to offer – those magnificent Copernican moments,
when what we had always assumed to be part of the structure of reality is revealed
as an artifact of our parochial viewpoint. This is what Boltzmann proposes about
the direction of time, and it isn’t a good objection to a well-motivated suggestion
of this kind – i.e., in particular, a suggestion motivated by our developing sense of
the world’s basic symmetries – to point out that if we were to follow the same path
all the way to the horizon, we would end up as über-Kantian idealists, attributing
all structure to our own viewpoint. After all, there be monsters at the other end

of the slope, too – Solipsism and Ignorance, to name but two. So we need to
stick out our necks to some extent, and the safest policy seems to be to follow the
recommendations of physics, in so far as we can understand what they are. The
question is, has Boltzmann got them right, in the case of the direction of time?
. Counting worlds
We have been considering such arguments as may be found in Earman’s ()
paper for answering “No” to his own question:
P Does the world come equipped with a time orientation?
There’s a prior question, which Earman does not formulate explicitly. Let’s call it:
P What would it be for the world to “come equipped with a time ori-
entation” (in the sense required by a positive answer to P)?
The answer to P implicit in Earman’s paper is in terms of the distinctness of
worlds. It is the denial of the view he attributes to Reichenbach and Gold:
[F]or any mMTD , m and T(m) are not descriptions of two different
physically possible worlds but rather are “equivalent descriptions” of
one and the same world . . . . (: )
In other words, Earman’s answer to P seems to be that for the world described by
theory T to come equipped with a time orientation is for m and T(m) to describe
different possible worlds.
At first sight, the most helpful part of this suggestion seems to be the idea that
a temporal orientation doubles the number of possible worlds. After all, there’s
going to be an obvious move of claiming that both m and T(m) can be construed
as description of either one of the pair of worlds concerned, under an appropri-
ate transformation of “description”. The bulwark against the Reichenbach–Gold
view is the seemingly objective fact about the number of worlds.
Or is it? Mere world counting can’t do the trick, presumably. Any addi-
tional binary property of world-histories will multiply possible worlds in this way,
whether it is temporal or not. World counting alone takes us no closer to an un-
derstanding of what it is for two worlds to differ specifically with respect to the
direction of time. By analogy, the question of objective parity isn’t settled by the
issue of what choices God faces when he creates a one-hand world, unless we have
already singled-out parity from other properties that might distinguish two hands.
The move is a baby case of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, and, in virtue of the symme-
tries, especially hard to resist.

(The distinction between red hands and green hands will double God’s choices,
too, but objective colour has nothing to do with objective parity.)
At this point, I find it very difficult to see, in the abstract, how anything could
count as a satisfactory answer to P. Accordingly – conscious of the dialectical
deficiencies of stares, whether incredulous, puzzled or merely blank! – I want
to try to bring the issue down to earth. I want to return to questions about
possible lines of inference from observed temporal asymmetries to knowledge of
temporal orientation; in the hope that this will clarify the issue of the content of
such knowledge, as well as the problems or opportunities for its acquisition.
. Three grades of temporal asymmetry
Suppose everything in the universe were to vanish, except a single giant signpost,
pointing forlornly to a particular corner of the sky. Or suppose that a universe
had always been like this. This spatial asymmetry would not require that space it-
self be anisotropic, presumably, or that the direction in question be distinguished
by anything other than the fact that it happened to be the orientation of sign-
post. Similarly in the case of time. The contents of time – i.e., the arrangement
of physical stuff – might be temporally asymmetric, without time itself having
any asymmetry. Accordingly, we need to be cautious in making inferences from
observed temporal asymmetries to the anisotropy of time itself.
This caution-requiring step precedes another, if our interest is the direction of
time in Earman’s and Maudlin’s sense. As we noted earlier, temporal anisotropy
is necessary but certainly not sufficient for a direction of time: not all possible
anisotropies have the right character to constitute the direction of time. Imagine
some simple cases: suppose time is finite in one direction, infinite in the other;
or more granular in one direction than the other (in the sense that the gaps in
discrete time get progressively smaller). In both cases, it would seem reasonable
to say that time itself was anisotropic. But what relevance would factors like this
have for the existence or orientation of an objective distinction between earlier
and later, or for “passage”? Why shouldn’t it remain an open question whether the
asymmetrically bounded universe had an objective temporal direction at all; and
if so, whether the bounded end was really the past or the future?
In order to exercise due caution at both steps, a defender of the objective
direction of time thus needs to answers to questions such as these:
. Is time anisotropic at all, and how could we tell? What could constitute
good grounds for taking it to be so, and do we have such grounds?
. What kind of temporal anisotropy would be the right kind, from the point
of view of grounding temporal passage? And what kind of grounds do we

have for thinking that time is anisotropic in this sense?
Can these questions lead us to an answer to P?
.. The epistemology of anisotropy
Taking the easier question first, what would count as evidence of anisotropy? Some
writers take the view that time-asymmetry in the physical laws would be evidence
of anisotropy. For example, Paul Horwich argues that in this case the anisotropy
of time would be an hypothesis with explanatory force:
Once a genuine instance of nomological irreversibility has been iden-
tified, it is not hard to justify the inference that time is anistropic.
Suppose there is a physically possible process ABCD whose temporal
inverse is impossible. Let (ABCD) designate the process whose tem-
poral orientation is unspecified—merely that B occurs between A and
C, and C between B and D. Then a physically necessary condition for
the occurrence of (ABCD) is that A is earlier than B. Thus the rela-
tion earlier than enters into explanations that are fundamental, for we
have no deeper account of that necessary condition. In particular, we
cannot suppose that the possibility of (ABCD) will be found to de-
pend on its orientation relative to certain other events: for in that case
the reverse of ABCD would not be physically impossible. (: )
However, I think this argument overlooks the fact that there will always be a
“Machian” reading of the kind of lawlike irreversibility that Horwich has in mind
here – simply a law to the effect that all instances of the kind (ABCD) have the
same temporal orientation. The Machian law will do the same job of explaining
the orientation of any particular (ABCD): the opposite orientation would not
match all the other instances. True, it won’t explain why it isn’t the case that all
instances have the opposite orientation. But even if we grant for the moment that
this is a distinct possibility, rather than a notational variant (more on this issue
below), Horwich’s version of the explanation shares an exactly analogous deficit:
in his case, there is nothing to explain we don’t find the reverse law, with respect to
the temporal anisotropy in question. (Why shouldn’t it be later rather than earlier
that does the explanatory job, as it were?)
In the present context, the main relevance of this point is that it suggests that
proponents of the view that time has an intrinsic direction are even further away
Indeed, Horwich (: ) seems to conclude that this is both necessary and sufficient for
anisotropy.
Cf. Pooley () for a convincing presentation of this kind of argument.

from their goal than might be supposed. Anisotropy isn’t sufficient for their case,
but it is necessary; and they frequently take heart from the one apparent case of
a fundamental lawlike time-asymmetry in contemporary physics, the so-called T
violation. Thus Maudlin, for example:
The discovery that physical processes are not, in any sense, indiffer-
ent to the direction of time is important and well known: it is the
discovery of the violation of so-called CP invariance, as observed in
the decay of the neutral K meson. . . . [V]iolation of CP implies a
violation of T. In short, the fundamental laws of physics, as we have
them, do require a temporal orientation on the space-time manifold.
(: )
One way to read this passage – not, as we’ll see, the reading that Maudlin
intends – would be to interpret “require a temporal orientation on the space-time
manifold” as meaning “require that space-time be temporally orientable.” In that
case, the conclusion seems correct. What would it mean to say the laws exhibited
a specific temporal asymmetry, unless one could orient a choice of temporal coor-
dinate consistently across space-time, in the manner guaranteed by orientability?
This isn’t what Maudlin has in mind, however. Orientability is a much weaker
condition than existence of an objective distinction between earlier and later – it
doesn’t imply even that time is anisotropic, much less that it is objectively directed.
Where Maudlin makes the above remarks, he himself has just distinguished ori-
entability from the existence of a temporal orientation, noting that in the relativis-
tic models with which he is concerned, the former is provided by the light-cone
structure: they are “space-times in which the light-cones are divided into two
classes, such that any continuous timelike vector field contains only vectors which
lie in one of the classes.” (: )
Maudlin then notes what we need to add to such a model, to provide an
orientation, or distinguished direction:
[What] we need to do is to identify one of these classes as the future
light-cones and the other as the past light-cones. Once I know which
set is which, I can easily distinguish a Mars-to-Earth asteroid from an
Earth-to-Mars one. (: )
It is controversial whether this should be counted a case of time-asymmetry at all. Arntzenius
and Greaves () argue that what it reveals is simply that time-reversal requires CP reversal, as
well as T reversal. Under that construal, there is no fundamental irreversibility. But I put that aside.
In the light of Maudlin’s blunt endorsement of Earman’s Heresy, it is a little surprising to find
him in this camp, taking issues of T invariance to be relevant, one way or the other, to the existence
of an objective orientation of time. However, the passage provides a convenient statement of a
common view.

In the passage quoted previously, then, we should read Maudlin as claiming that
the T-violation exhibited by the neutral kaon “requires” such an orientation. But
as our objection to Horwich’s argument makes clear, however, this is simply not
true: a lawlike time asymmetry does not even require temporal anisotropy, let
alone the true directionality that Maudlin is after. It is true, of course, that the
T-asymmetry of the neutral kaon could provide the basis of a universal convention
for labelling lightcones as “past” and “future”. But this no more requires that
time even be anisotropic – let alone objectively oriented – than does our universal
signpost for space, in the example above.
.. An arrow that couldn’t point backwards?
Suppose for the moment that Horwich, Maudlin and others were right, and that
a lawlike T-violation such as that of the neutral kaon did require, or at least pro-
vide evidence for, a temporal anisotropy. As we have stressed, such an anisotropy
would not necessarily provide an objective direction. It would explain neither
what constitutes the objective distinction between past and future, if there is such
a thing; nor how we could know which direction was which. By the lights of a
proponent of the view that time has an intrinsic direction, after all, it would still
seem to be an open question whether this nomologically-characterised arrow really
points towards the past or the future. (Couldn’t God have made the world with
the reverse asymmetry, with respect to the objective earlier–later distinction?)
This challenge gives us a handle on our second question above – on the issue
of what kind of temporal anisotropy would be the right kind, for a defender of the
view that time has an objective direction. It has to be an asymmetry which comes
with an answer to the open question objection. This challenge functions much
like open question arguments elsewhere in philosophy. It objects to any proposed
reduction-base for the fundamental asymmetry that it cannot be what we were
after, because, in making sense of the issue of its own temporal orientation, we
defeat the proposed identification.
To meet this objection, any proposed fundamental asymmetry needs to “con-
nect” with something already in play – with something that can be argued to be
constitutive of the distinction between past and future, apparently, since only this
will defeat the open question. There seem to be three candidates: the special
(low-entropy) initial conditions of the universe, causation, and conscious experience.
By way of analogy, consider again a modified Kantian example: a universe comprising many
hands, in which it is a matter of law that all the hands are congruent. The laws of this world certainly
exhibit a strong P violation, but the law as formulated compares hands only to other hands, not to
space itself; and requires no fact of the matter about whether they are “really” left hands or right
hands. So, despite the lawlike P violation, space itself need not be handed – let alone objectively
handed in one sense rather than the other.

.. Initial conditions
The case for including initial conditions on this list rests on the argument that
the familiar temporal asymmetries of our experience – including the asymmetry
of our own memories – turn out to depend on the fact that the universe was in
a state of very low entropy, some time in the distant past. Leaving the details
entirely to one side, the crucial point, for present purposes, is the suggestion that
it is not accidental that the low entropy boundary lies in the past. If ‘past’ means,
inter alia, something like the direction in which we remember things, then it is not
an open question why the low entropy boundary condition lies in the past but not
the future.
That’s the good news. The bad news comes in three parts:
. First, and perhaps most obviously, there’s the issue put on the table by Boltz-
mann. What if the required “initial” conditions are not found uniquely at
one temporal extremity of the universe, but can occur in multiple locations,
in either temporal direction from our own era?
. Second, even if we could assume that the required conditions were unique,
it is far from clear that a low entropy initial condition need constitute an
anisotropy of time at all. On the contrary, it is usually presented as a tempo-
ral asymmetry in the physical arrangement of matter within space and time
– and in the classical case it is hard to see how else one could present it.
. Third, the point of Boltzmann’s speculation – which is the origin of this
proposal to tie low entropy boundary conditions with the intuitive idea of
the past – is that it leads to a picture in which the direction of time is
not fundamental. At best, it is something we have ‘locally’, in appropriate
proximity to non-equilibrium regions. With Boltzmann’s picture in play,
what reason do we have to think that the direction of time is anything more
fundamental, even if the low-entropy boundary condition were unique? If
Boltzmann’s picture could ‘explain the appearances’ in the non-unique case,
why is something more fundamental needed to do so in the unique case?
In answer to the second point, it might be pointed out that general relativ-
ity introduces other possibilities. Roger Penrose (, chs. –), for example,
proposes that the low entropy boundary condition is a product of a lawlike time-
asymmetric constraint on spacetime, namely, that its Weyl curvature be zero (or
at least finite) at initial singularities. Here, the source of the low entropy past
Maudlin himself wants to challenge the claim that Boltzmann’s hypothesis could explain the
appearances, in the non-unique case. We’ll come to those objections in a moment.

seems explicitly represented as a feature of spacetime – and in a way which makes
it unique, apparently, thus offering a solution to the uniqueness problem, too.
Perhaps the simplest way to see how little this helps with the main problem is
to ask what difference it would make if we considered a time-symmetric version
of Penrose’s proposal, with a lawlike low entropy constraint at both ends of a
recollapsing universe (or the middle of a bouncing universe, or simply Boltzmann
fluctuations). In that case, for Boltzmann-like reasons, we want to say that there is
no global direction of time, but only local ‘explanations of the appearances’. But
such an addition takes away nothing from the model in the regions in which it
coincides with the original model, apparently – there’s no objective direction of
time which we have to remove from the model, in order to make it symmetric.
So there’s nothing over and above ‘explanation of the appearances’ in the original
case, either.
.. A causal arrow as the key to the temporal arrow?
The second possibility is that the causal or ‘production’ arrow might ground the
direction of time. Earman mentions this idea:
T can be time reversal invariant although T ` (E(x, y) ↔ R(x, y))
where [R(x, y)] is interpreted to mean that it is physically possible for
events at x to cause events at y via causal signals. (: )
This is a large topic, but we can deal with it expeditiously. If the causal arrow
is to play this role, it needs to be sufficiently objective and global to underpin a
universal direction of time, and sufficiently linked other matters not only to be
epistemologically accessible, but also to avoid the open question problem. What
could the other matters be? If asymmetric boundary conditions, then we are back
to the previous case. If the laws of physics, then there are two problems: first,
the whole idea will collapse if the laws are T-symmetric, contrary to Earman’s and
Maudlin’s intention to find a notion of direction of time not tied to failures of
T-invariance; and second, lawlike violations of T-symmetry are vulnerable to the
open question objection, as we’ve already noted.
The one remaining option seems to be to tie the causal arrow to the temporal
perspective of observers and agents. This is a good move, in my view, because,
as I’ve argued elsewhere – e.g., Price (, a, b, , ), Price &
Weslake () – nothing else turns out to be capable of explaining the intuitive
asymmetry of causation. But in the present context, it takes us to immediately to
This conclusion is hardly surprising. Once we’ve seen why up and down are relative to our
standpoint, we see that we wouldn’t be tempted to regard up as any more objective, if everywhere
except Antarctica became uninhabitable.

the question as to whether, constituitively or at least epistemologically, conscious
experience plays a fundamental role in the case for a direction of time.
Conscious experience could only play this role if it itself is unidirectional,
but this is precisely the assumption that Boltzmann challenges, in the passage
we quoted earlier. Boltzmann offers us a picture of the universe in which not
all conscious observers “point the same way” in time – some have the opposite
orientation to us – and invites us to find it plausible that there can’t be a fact
of the matter about who gets it right. So a friend of the view that time has an
objective direction – especially one who agrees that conscious experience plays a
crucial role in making the case for this view – needs a response to Boltzmann.
. Maudlin v. Boltzmann on ‘backward brains’
Maudlin offers such a response, in recent work. Maudlin’s immediate target is an
argument by D. C.Williams (and a related argument by me). However, Williams’s
example is simply a philosophically-motivated version of Boltzmann’s, so we may
take Maudlin to be responding to Boltzmann, too. Here is Maudlin’s characteri-
sation of the Boltzmann–Williams argument:
If we accept that the relevant physics is Time Reversal Invariant, then
we accept that [our] time-reversed Doppelgänger is physically possi-
ble. Let’s suppose, then, that such a Doppelgänger exists somewhere
in the universe. What should we conclude about its mental life?
The objector, of course, wants to conclude that the mental state
of the Doppelgänger is, from a subjective viewpoint, just like ours. So
just as we judge the ‘direction of the passage to time’ to go from our
infant stage to our grey-haired, so too with the Doppelgänger. But
that direction, for the Doppelgänger, is oppositely oriented to ours.
So the Doppelgänger will judge that the temporal direction into the
future points opposite to the way we judge it. And if we insist that
there is a direction of time, and we know what it is, then we must say
that the Doppelgänger is deceived, and has mistaken the direction of
time. But now we become worried: the Doppelgänger seems to have
exactly the same evidence about the direction of time as we do. So
how do we know that (as it were) we are not the Doppelgängers, that
we are not mistaken about the direction of time. If there is a direction
of time, it would seem to become epistemically inaccessible. And at
this point, it seems best to drop the idea of such a direction altogether.
But is this correct? (: –)

Maudlin now introduces a terminological convention, before offering his re-
sponse to the Doppelgänger argument:
In order to facilitate the discussion, I will refer to corresponding bits
of the Doppelgänger with a simple modfication of the terms for parts
of the original person. For example, I will speak of the Doppelgänger’s
neuron*s: these are just the bits of the Doppelgänger that correspond,
under the obvious mapping, to the original’s neurons. . . .
[G]iven the physical description of the Doppelgänger that we
have, what can we conclude about its mental state? The answer, I
think, is that we would have no reason whatsoever to believe that the
Doppelgänger has a mental state at all. After all, the physical pro-
cesses going on the Doppelgänger’s brain* are quite unlike the pro-
cesses going on in a normal brain. Nerve impulses* do not travel
along dendrites to the cell body, which then fires a pulse out along the
axon. Rather, pulses travel up the axon* to the cell body*, which (in a
rather unpredictable way) sends pulses out along the dendrite*s. The
visual system* of the Doppelgänger is also quite unusual: rather than
absorbing light from the environment, the retina*s emit light out into
the environment. (The emitted light is correlated with the environ-
ment in a way that would seem miraculous if we did not know how
the physical state of the Doppelgänger was fixed: by time-reversing
a normal person.) There is no reason to belabour the point: in ev-
ery detail, the physical processes going on in the Doppelgänger are
completely unlike any physical processes we have ever encountered or
studied in a laboratory, quite unlike any biological processes we have
ever met. We have no reason whatsoever to suppose that any mental
state at all would [be] associated with the physical processes in the
Doppelgänger. Given that the Doppelgänger anti-metabolises, etc.,
it is doubtful that it could even properly be called a living organism
(rather than a living* organism*), much less a conscious living organ-
ism. (: –)
However, it is easy to imagine an analogous argument against the claim that
we might to expect to find conscious life, or any sort of life, on distant plan-
ets. After all, imagine a Doppelgänger of one of us, on Planet Zogg. Following
Maudlin’s example, let’s use a superscript notation to denote bits of, and processes
within, the Doppelgänger that correspond to bits and processes in us, under the
obvious Zogg–Earth translation: the Doppelgänger thus has neuronsz, for exam-
ple. The analogous argument now runs like this, with the obvious modifications
to Maudlin’s text:

[T]he physical processes going on the Doppelgänger’s brainz are quite
unlike the processes going on in a normal brain. Nerve impulsesz do
not travel along dendrites to the cell body, which then fires a pulse
out along the axon. Rather, [impulsesz travelz along dendritesz to the
cell bodyz, which then firesz a pulsez out along the axonz.] . . . There
is no reason to belabour the point: in every detail, the physical pro-
cesses going on in the Doppelgänger are completely unlike any phys-
ical processes we have ever encountered or studied in a laboratory,
quite unlike any biological processes we have ever met. We have no
reason whatsoever to suppose that any mental state at all would be as-
sociated with the physical processes in the Doppelgänger. Given that
the Doppelgänger metabolisesz, etc., it is doubtful that it could even
properly be called a living organism (rather than a livingz organismz),
much less a conscious living organism.
Why is this argument unconvincing? Essentially, because we regard spatial
translation as a fundamental physical symmetry, and therefore expect that it holds
in biology and psychology, too. Far from being “completely unlike any physical
processes we have ever encountered,” the processes in question are exactly alike,
by the similarity standards embodied in the fundamental symmetries. It could be
that these symmetries break down for life, or consciousness. But that would be a
huge surprise, surely. And similarly for T or CPT symmetry. So far from having
“no reason whatsoever to suppose that any mental state at all would be associated
with the physical processes in the Doppelgänger”, we have a reason grounded on
an excellent general principle: physical symmetries carry over to the levels that
supervene on physics.
Maudlin would reply, I think, that this appeal to the symmetries just begs the
question against his view. If there is an objective direction of time it is surely
part of physics – in which case physics is not T-reversal symmetric, and there’s
no failure of supervenience. The latter claims are correct, as far as they go, as
are the analogous claims about spatial translation symmetry. If the position of
the Earth is objectively distinguished, in the way imagined, then physics is not
translation-invariant – a fact evidenced by the zombie-like nature of our Zoggian
Doppelgängers. Again, there’s no failure of supervenience involved in the huge
mental difference between us and them, because it sits on top of a huge physical
difference.
But let us be clear about the commitments of this position. Recall Maudlin’s
central example, that of an asteroid travelling between Mars and Earth. The pas-
sage of time is supposed to provide what it takes to make it the case that the
asteroid is actually moving in one direction rather than the other. If we describe

the process without stipulating in which direction time is taken to be passing,
we leave something out: our representation is incomplete. A familiar example
of an incomplete representation in this context is that of a movie, which can be
shown to an audience “forwards” or “backwards” – i.e. with either ordering of the
frames. Let’s call physical processes “time-blind” to the extent that their appear-
ance in such a movie doesn’t give the game away. So asteroid motion, in particular,
is time-blind.
What else is time-blind? In particular, what about conscious experience? Here
the defender of an objective direction of time faces a dilemma: either conscious-
ness is time-blind, too, in which case the internal phenomenology “as of” an orien-
tation in time doesn’t actually fix the direction of a mental life; or there is a radical
discontinuity between consciousness on the one hand, and ordinary physical sys-
tems, on the other. The former option undermines the claim that our conscious
experience could be a guide to existence or orientation of a privileged direction of
time; while the latter seems contrary to the spirit of physicalism, in the sense that
it implies that there is something that can be detected by a conscious instrument
that cannot be detected by a physical instrument.
Maudlin is willing to grasp the second horn of this dilemma, and he is not the
first to do so. Eddington, too, came this way:
The view here advocated is tantamount to an admission that con-
sciousness, looking out through a private door, can learn by direct
insight an underlying character of the world which physical measure-
ments do not betray. (Eddington : )
While such views don’t violate the letter of physicalism, they are certainly unap-
pealing to physicalist intuitions – spooky both on the side of physics, in requiring
that there is an element of the physical world so secretive as to be detectable only
by minds; and on the side of the theory of mind, in assuming that minds have the
ability to detect a fundamental aspect of reality, detectable in no other way.
True, “unappealing to physicalist intuitions” is very far from “untenable”. But
Maudlin himself wants to appeal to orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, so it does
seem a fair point to use against him. Responding to the challenge in (Price )
that the Doppelgänger argument undermines an appeal to conscious experience
in support of a flow of time, Maudlin says this:
[T]he response to Price is even more stark. He imagines a Doppel-
gänger which is not just reversed in time, but a Doppelgänger in a
A comparison might be with EugeneWigner’s view that it takes a conscious observer to collapse
the wave packet in quantum mechanics. This proposal is unappealing to physicalist intuitions in a
similar way.

world with no objective flow of time at all, i.e. (according to his op-
ponent) to a world in which there is no time at all, perhaps a purely
spatial four-dimensional world. So it not just that the nerve pulse*s
of this Doppelgänger go the wrong way (compared to normal nerve
pulses), these nerve pulse*s don’t go anywhere at all. Nothing hap-
pens in this world. True, there is a mapping from bits of this world
to bits of our own, but (unless one already has begged the central
question) the state of this world is so unlike the physical state of any-
thing in our universe, that to suppose that there are mental states at
all is completely unfounded. (Even pure functionalists, who suppose
that mental states can supervene on all manner of physical substrate,
use temporal notions in defining the relevant functional characteriza-
tions. Even pure functionalists would discern no mental states here.)
(: –)
This appeal to the authority of functionalists is optimistic, to say the least. Of
course, functionalists “use temporal notions.” But equally obviously, they don’t
do so (typically!) under the supposition that Maudlin makes here, that genuine
temporality requires flow. If we insist on adding that supposition as a termi-
nological stipulation, a typical functionalist will simply reformulate her view in
non-temporal terms, to avoiding signing up for objective passage.
Indeed, if we want an example of a functionalist who is explicit about not
signing up for Maudlin’s picture – with its lawlike, unidirectional conception of
time and causation – we need look no further than the greatest of them all. Here
is David Lewis, giving us his view of the character of the causal asymmetry:
Let me emphasize, once more, that the asymmetry of overdetermi-
nation is a contingent, de facto matter. Moreover, it may be a local
matter, holding near here but not in remote parts of time and space.
If so, then all that rests on it—the asymmetries of miracles, of coun-
terfactual dependence, of causation and openness—may likewise be
local and subject to exceptions. (: )
As for Maudlin’s suggestion that my argument begs the question against the
proponent of objective temporal flow, I think he is mistaken about the dialectic.
My argument is a reply to the suggestion that temporal phenomenology provides
reason to believe in an objective flow of time. It proceeds by pointing out that to
whatever flow-invoking hypothesis is offered in explanation of the agreed temporal
phenomenology, there’s a parallel hypothesis – generated by an obvious mapping
between underlying brain states as described in the flow picture and the corre-
sponding brain states as described in the flowless picture – offering an explanation
of the same phenomena without invoking flow.

Maudlin objects as if the flow-invoking hypothesis is already confirmed by
direct experience, while its rival remains mere speculation. But this is not the
relevant dialectical position at all. Rather, we need to suppose ourselves open-
minded about whether there is flow, and hence in the business of considering
hypotheses that might provide reason for coming down on one side or other. The
situation is then as I claimed. The phenomena do not support the existence of
flow, because – at least for a physicalist – any flow-invoking explanation of the
phenomena is easily matched by a flowless explanation.
. Summary
At the end of §., I claimed to be at a loss to find any answer, in the abstract,
to our question P: What would it be for the world to come equipped with a
time orientation? We then set out to investigate the issue from the (epistemo-
logical) ground up, by asking what kinds of T-asymmetry might provide evidence
either for temporal anisotropy or (more problematically) for an objective temporal
orientation. The answer to the latter part of this question has turned out to be
Eddington’s: if there is evidence for orientation, it lies in the special character of
our temporal phenomenology. And in the light of Boltzmann’s challenge, it must
be held to be evidenced in no other way.
Thus we can say this much in answer to P. For the world to come equipped
with a time orientation to which we have access is for there to be some time-
asymmetric “underlying character of the world” (as Eddington puts it), on which
conscious experience provides “a private door”. This helps a little with my puzzle-
ment, in the sense that the box of options no longer seems entirely empty, but it is
hardly satisfying. The proposal remains vulnerable to my version of the Doppel-
gänger objection – viz., that we have been offered no convincing argument that
our temporal experience needs such an explanation (the role of the Doppelgänger
being to generate “directionless” or “flowless” alternatives to any attempt to show
how a direction or flow would explain the phenomenology). And it conflicts with
physicalist intuitions, in the sense explained above. Eddington himself nails one
aspect of this concern:
The physicist, whose method of inquiry depends on sharpening up
our sense organs by auxiliary apparatus of precision, naturally does
not look kindly on private doors, through which all forms of super-
stitious fancy might enter unchecked. (: )
But, apt as it is, this characterisation makes the physicist, not the physicalist, the
aggrieved party. The physicalist’s concern is not that conscious experience tends
to be an unreliable guide to nature, but that mind should thought of, qua object

rather than observer, as merely a part of physical nature. This commitment sits
extremely uncomfortably with the view that there is a fundamental feature of the
world to which only conscious minds are sensitive.
I conclude that while the proposal that time has an objective orientation is
not incoherent, it is both (i) a long way out on a philosophical limb, in virtue
of its conflict with physicalism; and (ii) entirely unsupported by its own claimed
grounds, in virtue of the ready availability of alternative explanations of the rele-
vant phenomenology. Hence it is hardly an appealing alternative to Boltzmann’s
view.
 Objective flux?
The third ingredient of the “passage package” is the idea that time has a transitory,
flux-like, or dynamic character, of a kind not captured by the spatialised concep-
tion of time that is prevalent in physics (and popular with opponents of objective
passage). Usually, of course, this ingredient is bundled with the other two: the
transition in question is thought of as that of a distinguished moment, and as pos-
sessing a particular orientation. The new ingredient of the bundle – the ingredient
I take to be most characteristic of the notion of flux – is that it is something to
which a rate may sensibly be attached. Time passes at a certain number of seconds
per second.
For the purposes of this section, I want to detach this ingredient from the
familiar bundle. If we could make sense of this flux-like character of time at all,
I think we could make sense of a Boltzmann-friendly version of it, according to
which it did not have a preferred direction (and did not require a distinguished
present moment). That spare view is my target in this section. (It cannot be too
spare, however – we are still looking for something that distinguishes time from
space.)
. Objections to flow
One objection to the coherency of the notion of flow of time (see, e.g., Price ,
) turns on the fact that it is usually thought to have a preferred direction. The
objection is then that other flows acquire their objective direction, if any, from
that of time itself – think of Maudlin’s asteroids. But if the flow of time is itself
supposed to be constitutive of the direction of time, it needs to do double duty, so
to speak, to provide its own direction.
I think this is a good objection, but in this context I take it to be outranked by
the general discussion of objective direction in the previous section. For present
purposes, and in keeping with my strategy of distinguishing the three key strands

in the usual conception of the passage of time, I want to put the issue of direc-
tionality to one side. What is now on the table is a notion of temporal flux that
does not have a preferred direction, but merely an (undirected) rate. What can be
said about that proposal?
In earlier work I characterised the “stock objection” to the rate of flow of time
as follows:
If it made sense to say that time flows then it would make sense to ask
how fast it flows, which doesn’t seem to be a sensible question. (:
)
I went on to note that “[s]ome people reply that time flows at one second per
second,” but say that “even if we could live with the lack of other possibilities,”
there’s a more basic problem. Before criticising the latter claim, Maudlin offers
this response to the original objection:
What exactly is supposed to be objectionable about this answer? Price
says we must ‘live with the lack of other possibilities’, which indeed
we must: it is necessary, and, I suppose, a priori that if time passes
at all, it passes at one second per second. But that hardly makes the
answer either unintelligible or meaningless. Consider the notion of
a fair rate of exchange between currencies. If one selects a standard
set of items to be purchased, and has the costs of the items in various
currencies, then one may define a fair rate of exchange between the
currencies by equality of purchasing power: a fair exchange of euros
for dollars is however many euros will purchase exactly what the given
amount of dollars will purchase, and similarly for yen and yuan and
so on. What, then, is a fair rate of exchange of dollars for dollars?
Obviously, and necessarily, and a priori, one dollar per dollar. If you
think that this answer is meaningless, imagine your reaction to an
offer of exchange at any other rate. We do not need to ‘live with’ the
lack of other possibilities: no objectionable concession is required.
(: )
In reply to Maudlin’s suggestion, consider a graph of the amount of money
I give you in currency X, against the amount of money you give me in currency
Y. On such a graph, there is straight line marking the fair rate of exchange: as
Maudlin says, exchanges taking place at points on that line can be interpreted in
terms of equal purchasing power. And when X and Y are the same currency, the
slope of that line is .
Which I won’t try to defend here – in this respect, I now think, my bad.

So far, so good. But what are the two axes, in the temporal case? One
(corresponding to the numerator) measures the amount of time passed between
two times t and t (cf., e.g., the amount of fuel dispensed by a pump between
two times t and t); the other, corresponding to the denominator, measures the
amount of time it takes for that amount of time to pass (cf., the amount of time
taken for that amount of fuel to be dispensed – the amount of time between t
and t).
The problem is not that these amounts of time are necessarily, a priori, of equal
length. The problem is that they are the very same thing. The claim about the rate
is informative to the same degree that the following statement is informative:
Taking the Hume Highway from Sydney to Melbourne, the traveller
completes his journey at a rate of one yard per yard traversed. By the
time Melbourne looms on the southern horizon, he has put behind
him more than  miles, over a distance of the same magnitude.’
This tells us that Melbourne is more than  miles from Sydney (via the Hume
Highway), but the reference to rate is entirely vacuous. We can inform travellers
about the number of kangaroos, or fence posts, or public conveniences, they will
encounter per mile of their journey. We cannot sensibly inform them of how
many miles they will encounter per mile, for here there are not two things – a tally
of kangaroos, say, and a tally of miles – but just one (the tally of miles). Maudlin’s
exchange rate example misses this point, because it provides two things to tally:
the dollars you give me, and the dollars I give you.
In defence of Maudlin, one might say that triviality isn’t a fault but a feature
– isn’t that the point of his comparison with the fair rate of exchange? Fine, but
we’ve just seen that we can have spatial rates in the same (trivial) sense. What we
were after was a notion of flow, or flux, which would capture what’s supposed to
be special about time. What we have been given is a notion of flow so thin that
the only thing that distinguishes time and space is that in one case the progression
is at one minute per minute, in the other case at one metre per metre – i.e., that
in one case it is time, in the other case space!
 Proving the pudding
I conclude that all three of the paths that seemed variously co-mingled in philo-
sophical accounts of the flow of time – a distinguished present, an objective tem-
poral direction, and a flux-like character, distinctive to time – are theoretical dead
ends. In most cases, it is difficult to see what coherent sense can be made of these
notions, let alone how they could be supported by evidence or argument.

This is good news for the alternative view of time – for Boltzmann’s Block, as we
might call it, to acknowledge Boltzmann’s “keen” insight, that the block need have
no preferred temporal direction. Lest we Boltzmannians should become compla-
cent, however, I want to finish by stressing two respects in which the project is
very far from complete. One of these tasks is familiar, the other less so. Both are
crucial, in my view, and I think that together they should be setting the agenda
for future research in philosophy of time.
. The flow of time as a secondary quality
The familiar task is that of explaining the temporal character of conscious ex-
perience; explaining the phenomenology, in virtue of which the notion of the
passage of time has such a powerful grip on us. If consciousness is not, as Edding-
ton suggests, “looking out through a private door”, at the “underlying [temporal]
character of the world,” what gives us the impression that it is doing so?
This is the project of explaining how the flow of time is a secondary quality
– “resident solely in the sensitive body”, as Galileo puts it, rather than in the
objective world. I have nothing to contribute to this project here, but I would
like to record a conviction (wholly unoriginal) that at least part of the key lies in
the illusion of a persisting self. In a sense, I think, this is a double illusion. First,
there’s the contribution so nicely nailed by Austin Dobson:
TIME goes, you say? Ah no!
Alas, Time stays, we go.
In other words, we (mistakenly) treat ourselves as fixed points, and hence think of
time as flowing past us.
But this illusion rests in turn on a deeper one; that of a single persisting self,
self-identifying over time. I think that Jenann Ismael is correct about the origin of
this deeper illusion, in treating it as what she calls a ‘grammatical illusion’, resting
on an indexical ‘abuse of notation’:
When I talk or think about myself, I talk or think about the con-
nected, and more or less continuous, stream of mental life that in-
cludes this thought, expressing the tacit confidence that that is a
uniquely identifying description (in the same way I might speak con-
fidently of this river or this highway pointing at part of it, expressing
the tacit assumption that it doesn’t branch or merge), but it need not
be. There is no enduring subject, present on every occasion of ‘I’-use,
Il Saggiotore, from a passage quoted by Burtt (: ).
Austin Dobson, ‘The Paradox of Time’: http://smcdaniel.net/mrmcd’s/serendipty/time.html

encountered in toto in different temporal contexts. The impression
of a single thing reencountered across cycles of self-presentation is a
grammatical illusion . . . . (: )
That is, in my view, a key ingredient in an understanding of the flow of time as a
secondary quality, is an understanding of the enduring self as a secondary quality.
. Eddington’s challenge
For the less familiar task, I return to Eddington. As I noted above, Eddington is
well aware of the dangers of private doors:
The physicist, whose method of inquiry depends on sharpening up
our sense organs by auxiliary apparatus of precision, naturally does
not look kindly on private doors, through which all forms of super-
stitious fancy might enter unchecked. (: )
But he counters with a challenge which I think his opponents – we friends of
Boltzmann’s Block – have ignored to our cost. The above passage continues like
this:
But is he [i.e., the physicist who renounces private doors] ready to
forgo that knowledge of the going on of time which has reached us
through the door, and content himself with the time inferred from
sense-impressions which is emaciated of all dynamic quality?
No doubt some will reply that they are content; to these I would
say—Then show your good faith by reversing the dynamic quality
of time (which you may freely do if it has no importance in Na-
ture), and, just for a change, give us a picture of the universe pass-
ing from the more random to the less random state . . . If you are
an astronomer, tell how waves of light hurry in from the depths of
space and condense on to stars; how the complex solar system un-
winds itself into the evenness of a nebula. Is this the enlightened
outlook which you wish to substitute for the first chapter of Gene-
sis? If you genuinely believe that a contra-evolutionary theory is just
as true and as significant as an evolutionary theory, surely it is time
that a protest should be made against the entirely one-sided version
currently taught. (: –)
I want to make two responses to this challenge. The first is to note a respect
in which it is a little unfair to Boltzmann’s Block, or at least to Boltzmann himself
See Ismael (this volume) for more on this project.

– in one respect, Boltzmann is ahead of Eddington, I think. But the second is
to acknowledge that in other respects, Eddington makes a very important point.
In general, friends of Boltzmann’s Block have not done enough to free themselves
from the shackles of the pre-Copernican viewpoint; and in the long run, the best
case for Boltzmann’s view would flow from the clear advantages of doing so (were
such to be found).
Boltzmann is ahead of Eddington in offering us a picture in which the entropy
gradient is a local matter in the universe as a whole, entirely absent in most eras
and regions, and with no single preferred direction in those rare locations in which
it is to be found. Combined with Eddington’s own view that the asymmetries he
challenges his opponent to consider reversing – asymmetries of inference and ex-
planation, for example – have their origin in the entropy gradient, this means that
Boltzmann has an immediate answer to the challenge. Of course we can’t “[re-
verse] the dynamic quality of time” around here, for we live within the constraints
of the entropy gradient in the region in which we are born. But we can tell you, in
principle, how to find a region in the picture is properly reversed; and that shows
that the fixity of our own perspective does not reflect a fundamental asymmetry
in nature. Analogously (Boltzmann might add), the fact that men in Northern
Europe cannot live with their feet pointed to the Pole Star does not prove a spatial
anisotropy. If you want to live with your feet pointing that way, you simply need
to move elsewhere.
Moreover, Eddington associates the entropy gradient directly with the “time
of consciousness”:
It seems to me, therefore, that consciousness with its insistence on
time’s arrow and its rather erratic ideas of time measurement may be
guided by entropy-clocks in some portion of the brain. . . . Entropy-
gradient is then the direct equivalent of the time of consciousness in
both its aspects. (: )
So Boltzmann’s hypothesis also threatens the veracity of Eddington’s “private door”.
In broader terms, however, Eddington’s challenge has not been taken up. Most
advocates of the ‘no flow’ view – even those explicit about the possibility that time
might have no instrinsic direction – have not explored the question as to what
insights might follow from Boltzmann’s Copernican shift. I want to conclude
with some remarks on this issue. It seems to me that there are at least three
domains in which we might hope to vindicate Boltzmann’s Copernican viewpoint,
by exhibiting the advantages of the atemporal perspective it embodies.
For the benefit of young scholars reading this chapter in search of a thesis topic, I paraphrase
Jehangir’s famous tweet from Kashmir: “If time doth conceal a philosophers’ prize; here it lies, here
it lies, here it lies.”
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Cosmology. The first domain is that of cosmology. There are two aspects
to the relevance of Boltzmann’s viewpoint in this context. First, and closest to
Boltzmann’s own concerns, there is the project of understanding the origin of
the entropy gradient, in our region. One of the great advances in physics over
recent decades has been the realisation that this problem seems to turn on the
question as to why gravitational entropy was low, early in the history of the known
universe – in particular, why matter was smoothly distributed, to a very high
degree, approximately , years after the Big Bang. As we try to explain this
feature of the early stages of the known universe, Boltzmann’s hypothesis ought to
alert us to the possibility that it is non-unique – ought to open our eyes to a new
range of cosmological models, in which there is no single unique entropy gradient.
There is some work which takes this possibility seriously – see, e.g., Carroll
and Chen () and Carroll (, ch. ). However, there is much more work
in which it is either overlooked, or dismissed for what, with Boltzmann’s symmet-
ric viewpoint clearly in mind, can be seen to be fallacious reasons. For example,
the possibility that entropy might decrease ‘towards the future’ is dismissed on sta-
tistical grounds, with no attempt to explain why this is a good argument towards
the future, despite the fact that (i) it is manifestly a bad argument towards the
past, and (ii) that the relevant statistical considerations are time-symmetric. (See
Price () for criticism of such temporal ‘double standards’, and the role of the
timeless Copernican viewpoint in avoiding them.)
These considerations point in the direction of the second and broader aspect
of the relevance of Boltzmann’s Copernican viewpoint in cosmology. It alerts us to
the possibility that the usual model of ‘explanation-in-terms-of-initial-conditions’
might simply be the wrong one to use in the cosmological context, where the
features in need of explanation are larger and more inclusive than anything we en-
counter in the familiar region of our ‘home’ entropy gradient. Here, the point con-
nects directly with Eddington’s challenge, in the way noted above. We can concede
our local practices of inference and explanation are properly time-asymmetric, as
Eddington observes; while insisting that symmetry might prevail on a larger scale.
Modal metaphysics. Many modal properties and relations, such as chances,
powers, dispositions, and relations of causal and counterfactual dependence, seem
to exhibit a strong ‘past-to-future’ orientation. Sometimes this passes without
See Penrose (), Price (, ch. ; ; ), Albert () and Carroll () for ex-
positions of this story. See Earman () for some interesting criticism – though criticism largely
defused, in my view, by the observation (cf. Price , §., , §.) that the story in question
does not need to be told in thermodynamic terms. It can be regarded as an astrophysical explana-
tion of the existence of stars and galaxies (themselves by far the most striking manifestations of the
entropy gradient, in our region).

comment, but sometimes it is presented as a philosophical puzzle, especially in
the light of the apparent temporal symmetry of (most of ) fundamental physics. A
natural question is what we should say about these modal asymmetries in the con-
text of Boltzmann’s globally-symmetric viewpoint. Prima facie, there are several
possibilities. We might try to maintain that the modal asymmetries are primitives,
not dependent on the local entropy gradient, or the perspective of creatures whose
own temporal viewpoint depends on that gradient, in Boltzmann’s picture. But
this will have the disturbing consequence that some of Boltzmann’s intelligent ob-
servers will simply be wrong about the direction of these modal arrows – and how
could we tell that it wasn’t us?
For this reason, we might prefer to tie the modal asymmetries either directly to
the local entropy gradient, or indirectly to it, by associating it with the temporal
perspective or the observers and agents in question. But this has the consequence
that – like the direction of time itself – the modal asymmetries are bound to a lot
less fundamental than the pre-Copernican picture assumes, in Boltzmann’s model.
And this consequence may be of much more than merely philosophical interest,
if these asymmetric modal notions are applied unreflectively in science. If their
use does reflect a particular, contingent temporal perspective, then some parts of
science – and physics, especially – may be less objective than they are usually
assumed to be. So I think there is important work to be done on the relation of
modal concepts and the temporal contingencies of our physical situation. Once
again, the subject as a whole is still in its pre-Copernican phase, and Eddington’s
challenge goes largely unheeded.
Microphysics. Most interestingly of all, there is the possibility that the pre-
Copernican viewpoint might be standing in the way of progress needed in funda-
mental physics – that is, that there might be explanations to which this viewpoint
is at least a major obstacle, if not an impenetrable barrier. Here the most interest-
ing candidate, in my view, is the project of realist interpretations and extensions
of quantum mechanics. Discussions of hidden variable models normally take for
granted that in any reasonable model, hidden states will be independent of future
interactions to which the system in question might be subject. The spin of an
electron will not depend on what spin measurements it might be subject to in the
future, for example. Obviously, no one expects the same to be true in reverse.
On the contrary, we take for granted that the state of the electron may depend on
what has happened to it in the past. But how is this asymmetry to be justified,
if the gross familiar asymmetries of inference, influence and explanation are to be
associated with the entropy gradient, and this is a local matter? Are electrons sub-
ject to different laws in one region of the universe than in another, or “aware” of
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the prevailing entropy gradient in their region? On the contrary, in Boltzmann’s
picture: we want microphysics to provide the universal background, on top of
which the statistical asymmetries are superimposed.
This topic intersects closely with the last one. For it requires that we be careful
about what we mean by the state of a physical system – careful that we don’t simply
take for granted a conception that cements in place the kind of time-asymmetric
modal categories just mentioned. As I have noted elsewhere (Price, : ),
we find it very natural to think of the state of a system in terms of its dispositions
to respond to the range of circumstances it might encounter in the future. What
we use state descriptions for, above all else, is predicting such counterfactual, or
‘merely possible’, responses. However, if we want to allow for the possibility that
the present state is affected by future circumstances, this conception of the state
will have to go, apparently. After all, if different future circumstances produce
different present states, what sense can we make of the idea that the actual present
state predicts the system’s behaviour in a range of possible futures? If the future
were different, the actual present state wouldn’t be here to predict anything.
When we explore these issues, it might turn out that the apparently puzzling
assumption that hidden variables cannot depend on future interactions is merely
a manifestation of asymmetry of our modal notions – just a kind of perspectival
gloss on underlying dynamical principles which are symmetric in themselves. If so,
there would be no new physical mileage to be gained by adopting the Copernicam
viewpoint. Certainly, we would understand better what belonged to the physics
and what to our viewpoint, but no new physics would be on offer as a result.
However, the more intriguing possibility is that there is a new class of physical
models on offer here – models which are being ignored not for any genuinely good
reason, but only because they seem to conflict with our ordinary asymmetric per-
spective. If that’s the case, and if the models presently excluded have the potential
they seem to have in accounting for some of the puzzles of quantum mechanics,
then Boltzmann’s viewpoint will prove to be truly revolutionary; and Eddington’s
challenge will be well and truly met.
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